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ISSN # 1072-9496ABSTRACT
Despite national legislation and substantial donor investments,
watershed degradation continues to threaten the sustained
economic development and social welfare of millions of citizens
in the developing world.  Past efforts have largely concentrated
on the physical rather than institutional aspects of watersheds,
and have often relied on external incentives to coerce or
persuade individuals to adopt conservation practices.  In
contrast to this conventional "physical" perspective, watersheds
can be considered as sets of vested interests (and social
relations) within a physically defined space.  In essence,
watersheds are physically defined subsets of rural society.
Actors with vested interests within watersheds are interdependent
because of water flow across political boundaries.  From this
perspective, the achievement of watershed management is a
question of social relations, and cooperation between individual
actors.  Though there is growing realization for an expanded role
of local, cooperative institutions in watershed management,
theories on how such institutions might be identified, evolve or
be promoted are limited.  Toward this end, this paper examines
some of the theoretical aspects of landholder cooperation for
watershed management: the socio-political setting of upland
watersheds; the physical attributes of watersheds influencing
cooperation; the nature of externalities and incentives in
watersheds; and the economic and socio-cultural factors affecting
the emergence of collective action units.  The processes by which
collective action groups actually form are also reviewed.  The
paper concludes with a synthesis of the prospects for landholder
cooperation approaches, the appropriate role of policy and a
proposed process for promoting such cooperation.
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THE PROBLEM: MANAGING TRANS-BOUNDARY WATER FLOW IN UPLAND
WATERSHEDS
Rationale and Nature of Watershed Management
The Costs of Watershed Degradation
Watershed degradation threatens the sustained economic
development and social welfare of millions of citizens in
developing nations (FAO 1986).  In the Asia region for example,
about 65% of the rural population live and earn their livelihood
in upland watershed areas (Doolette and Magrath 1990).
Increasing human populations, inequitable land distributions,
inadequate governmental support for upland agriculture, and the
unintended side-effects of national economic policies foster
inappropriate land use and increasing environmental degradation.
Inappropriate land use can set off a chain of on-site events:
deforestation, soil erosion, declining crop yields, conversion
to unproductive uses, increasing rural poverty, and accelerated
out-migration.  Land degradation thus weakens the agricultural
sector, and the loss of agricultural revenue can negatively
impact food supply and prices at the local and national levels.
If agricultural exports are significant, inappropriate land use
can worsen the balance of payments and thus national economic
development.  Though it is difficult to predict exact hydrologic
responses to different land use activities, soil erosion also
causes substantial off-site damage: the silting of water courses,
dams and irrigation systems, further hindering economic
development (Hamilton and King 1983).  Rising costs of energy,
water and food can result.The Concept of Watershed Management
"Watershed management is the process of guiding and organizing
land and other resource use on a watershed to provide desired
goods and services without affecting adversely soil and water
resources.  Embedded in this concept is the recognition of the
interrelationships among land use, soil, and water, and the
linkages between uplands and downstream areas (Brooks et al.
1990b)."
The concept of watershed management can be applied to the full
range of watershed dimension and problem type; from soil erosion
in five hectare, peasant occupied, upland watersheds in Nepal, to
toxic organic pollution in the 374,000 square kilometer Baltic
sea, which crosses eight national boundaries.  Watershed
management might include agriculture, soil conservation and
forestry activities, but it differs from these separate fields in
recognizing and focussing on land use and its impacts on other
watershed interests due to trans-boundary water flow.  The fact
that water flows downhill, and does so irrespective of political
boundaries, is the central tenet of watershed management.  The
problem of coordination and cooperation is thus inherent to
watershed management.
Government Responses to Watershed Degradation
Widespread soil erosion and related watershed degradation is a
cause, symptom and result of underdevelopment, and comprehensive
resolution often requires nothing short of fundamental social
change (Blaikie 1985).  Ingredients of that change include broad
policy reforms to support the rural and agricultural sectors,
expand service and manufacturing sectors, dissuade population
expansion into fragile areas, and enforce land use regulations.
These reforms are undeniably exceedingly difficult if not
untenable undertakings in most developing countries today.
Though some developing countries have enacted specific
legislation aimed at protecting watersheds, few have been
successfully implemented and have resulted in sustained upland
management.
Japan is the only modern state to have established mechanisms in
which upstream landholders who implement conservationist measures
are directly reimbursed by downstream beneficiaries (Kumazaki
1982).  Other nations (notably Colombia and Venezuela), have
enacted legislation by which a portion of the profits from water
generated services ("e.g." energy or irrigation water) is given
to agencies entrusted with the conservation of watersheds
providing those services (Hernandez-Bercerra 1991).  Problems of
identifying specific land use criteria and devising practical
enforcement mechanisms, organizational weaknesses, and limited
funding have hindered the enforcement of legislation (Brooks et
al. 1990a).
Because of the widespread ineffectiveness of legislative
approaches, most developing countries have taken a "project"
approach to influencing land use in specific, fragile upland
areas.  When this approach is adopted, specific areas are
targeted, and special governmental or non-governmental
implementing organizations are established; usually withshort-term multi-lateral donor assistance.  A synopsis of this
"watershed management project" approach and some lessons from
experience follow.
Synopsis of Watershed Management Project Experience: Inadequate
Consideration of Institutional Issues
Conventional Project Experience
Development planners have generally approached watershed
management, and the design of watershed projects, from an
engineering perspective, focussing on the physical linkages
of soil, water and vegetation, and targeting select, degraded
watersheds.  Project decision-makers have generally promoted a
select number of internationally standard mechanical structures
for treating contiguous public and private lands, and are biased
to the protection of off-site rather than on-site benefits
(Unasylva 1991).  Monetary or commodity incentives have often
been used to encourage farmer participation and the adoption
of conservation techniques.  The general failure of watershed
management projects of this character to result in sustained
benefits, either on-site or off-, is now widely recognized
(Blaikie 1985, Easter "et.al." 1986, Michaelson 1991).
Part of this failure for watershed projects to achieve sustained
benefits can be explained by common weaknesses of the project
approach itself:  short-term funding; ties to political agendas;
top-down design processes; and steadfast preoccupation with
achieving verifiable and quantifiable project outputs.  In
addition, conventional projects have not, to a large degree, been
designed with popular participation in mind and with benefit
sustainability as a goal.  Despite possible improvements in
watershed management projects, it has perhaps always been
ambitious to think that sufficient national and donor funds exist
to attack widespread upland degradation when project sponsored
treatment can vary between $200 and $2000 per hectare (Pierce
1988).
Inadequate Consideration of Institutional Issues: A Key Cause of
Failure
There is growing consensus in the watershed management community
that a disproportionate amount of emphasis on the physical rather
than the institutional problems associated with watersheds is a
major cause of project failure [note 1].  Further, it is
increasingly realized that the sustainability of benefits
generated during a project is a direct function of the
sustainability of institutions participating in watershed
management.  In arguing for a new approach to watershed
management, Easter and Dixon (1986) stated that
"Once people are seen as legitimate (although sometimes
'illegal') users of the watershed resources, they will become
part of the solution rather than the problem.  The recognition of
the necessity of social-behavioral solutions to physical problems
has led to the integrated, multi-disciplinary approach
proposed...."Similarly, in a recent evaluation of watershed development in
Asia Doolette and Magrath (1990) found that:
"Discussions of watershed management are generally dominated by
concern about physical linkages related to movement of soil and
water within drainage basins.  While the significance of the
hydrologic cycle for water resource planning cannot be
overstated, research and project experience, however, show that
conventional approaches to watershed management have little
effect.  Often neglected in analyses of watershed management are
political, economic and social linkages between upstream and
downstream.  Understanding of and intervention in these areas
provide an under-exploited avenue to improve productivity and the
quality of life of upland populations."
After examining numerous World Bank and other watershed projects,
Brooks "et al." (1990b) stated that though physical linkages
cannot be excluded,
"The practical means of achieving  sustainable projects in
watershed management, conversely, cannot ignore land tenure,
institutions, and the culture of watershed inhabitants.  More
emphasis is needed on the development of human resources rather
than infrastructure."
In his popular text on the political economy of soil erosion
Blaikie (1985:88) also emphasized the importance of institutions:
"In summary, soil erosion problems can be analyzed in a framework
of Chinese boxes, each fitting inside the other,  The individual
within the household, the household itself, the village of local
community, the local bureaucracy, the bureaucracy, government and
nature of state, and finally international relations all
represent contexts within which actions affecting soil erosion
and conservation take place.  A specific analysis must identify
these contexts and the relationships between them."
In brief, watershed management project evaluations have generally
identified institutional weaknesses at three levels:  1) national
("e.g." inappropriate national economic policies, funding
commitments, or a lack of government agency coordination);  2)
project ("e.g." lack of integrating local institutions, concerns
or linkages into project planning and management); and  3) local
("e.g." failure to recognize and effectively promote cooperation
between watershed landholders) (after Brooks "et al." 1990a).
Upland Landholder Cooperation: One Potential Solution [note 2]
There is a need for the management of upland watersheds, both for
the protection of on-site and off-site interests.  Approaches to
achieve this management should meet at least the following
criteria:  1) the approach must result in sustained and diffused
upland management;  2) the approach must be affordable enough to
impact large areas (or at least require limited donor capital);
and  3) the approach must be politically and socio-culturally
appropriate.  Legislative and conventional project approaches
have frequently not met the above criteria.  Voluntary uplandlandholder cooperation, either promoted at national or project
levels, could meet the above criteria and is thus one potential
solution to watershed management problems.
Many authors and development workers have cited the need to
recognize and empower local, indigenous groups into natural
resource projects.  Several authors, notably Dani and Campbell
(1986) and Bochet (1986) have explicitly and thoroughly treated
the subject of local participation in watershed management
activities.  Fewer authors have specifically proposed the
promotion of collective landholder action for treating watershed
lands which are common to them.
Cernea (1989) has called for watershed management approaches
which form "watershed groups" (groups of farmers based on land
ownership within watersheds) to establish and maintain watershed
and forestry treatments.  In a similar vein, Murray (1990) has
promoted the establishment of "hillside units" of Haitian farmers
to collaborate on the treatment of contiguous watershed lands.
Uphoff (1986) also recommends the recognition and promotion of
local groups for watershed management.  McKean (1984 in Dixon and
Easter 1986) states that the though limited, the literature from
Japan shows that collective management is capable of assuring
stable and productive use of watersheds over a long period of
time.  None of the above authors has explicitly proposed methods
to form such groups, or discussed requisite incentive structures
for farmer participation.
Gibbs (1986) also concluded that watershed projects should adapt
their methods to reflect customary institutional arrangements,
and create incentives for local groups to participate in
watershed management activities.  Rocheleau and van den Hoek
(1984)  described a project where landholders of a small
watershed were encouraged to cooperate on the installation of
agroforestry treatments for watershed management.  No follow-up
reports which indicate the effectiveness of the project or
sustainability of the activity are publicly available.  Perhaps
the most concise and explicit call for research into landholder
cooperation for watershed management is found in Brooks "et al."
(1990)a:
"What is needed is basic research to identify possible mechanisms
to promote cooperation among watershed residents and users, and
the development of practical systematic methods for identifying
possible mechanisms on a case by case ("i.e.", project) level.
In this context it would be appropriate to look at both
traditional and current patterns of political and social
organization, particularly labor exchange, among the various
groups concerned, patterns of interaction among those groups and
between them and government officials, and the relative success
(or lack of it) of previous attempts to promote cooperation
within watershed areas."
In sum, there is consensus in the literature for the need of an
expanded role of local, cooperative institutions in watershed
management, but theories concerning such institutions, how they
might be identified, evolve or be promoted are limited.  Before
advancing this discussion of landholder cooperation for watershed
management, it is necessary to analyze the unique attributes of
watersheds.  What is it about watersheds that influence thelandholder cooperation?  How would collective action for
watershed management differ from collective action for common
property management, for community development, for irrigation,
or for agricultural tasks on private land?
THE SETTING: ATTRIBUTES OF UPLAND WATERSHEDS AFFECTING LANDHOLDER
COOPERATION
Socio-political Setting of Upland Watersheds
Rural areas in developing countries are generally characterized
by relative poverty, a dependence upon the local agriculture and
natural resource base, and a high degree of uncertainty
concerning income (Runge 1986).   The folk of upland watersheds
are often disproportionally disenfranchised because they are
frequently of different cultural heritage (and social system)
than lowland folk, of low relative population density, and are
physically isolated from lowland, modernizing societies (Lovelace
and Rambo 1986).  Dani (1986) describes the status of the Hindu
Kush people in terms of "alienation, annexation, and
underdeveloped."  These people are cognitively alienated from the
urban-based political forces which control their lives, and often
materially alienated from their own resources because of
nationalization of property or elimination of customary tenurial
arrangements.  Because of their perceived underdevelopment, these
people and their lifestyles are usually annexed ("i.e."
incorporated) into the more powerful lifestyles of downstream
society.
Though perhaps uniformly isolated from centers of authority, the
people of upland watersheds are certainly not a homogenous group.
It should be recognized that communities inhabiting watersheds
are composed of individuals who can vary greatly in many
characteristics and who may or may not interact (Cernea 1989).
Physical Attributes of Watersheds and Related Externalities
Strictly speaking, a watershed is topographically delineated area
that is drained by a single water course system.  The fundamental
tenet of a watershed is that water flows downhill.  The watershed
is thus a functional unit established by physical relationships
where upstream land use can incite a chain of environmental
impacts affecting downstream areas.  Another key characteristic
of watersheds is that they hold multiple, interconnected natural
resources: soil, water and vegetation.  Impact on one resource
invariably affect the status of others.
Watershed management differs from forestry, agriculture and water
development activities because it explicitly acknowledges and
embraces the physical linkages between these resources (Brooks
"et al." 1990b).  These physical relationships only become anissue when individuals have vested interests in a watershed or a
portion of a watershed ("i.e." it is populated, or valued by
external agents), which is usually the case in developing
countries.  These vested interests are separated by political
boundaries or institutional arrangements which normally do not
correspond to the topographic limits of watersheds (see Figure
1.).  The corollary to the "water flows downhill" tenet is the
fact that it does so irrespective of political boundaries.  The
trans-boundary water flow is essentially an asymmetrical
externality [note 3], and can be either positive (adding to the
value of downstream areas) or negative.   Thus in addition to the
watershed being a functional unit for physical reasons, the
watershed is a functional unit of multiple and interdependent
vested interests.
Examples of negative trans-boundary externalities include:
sediment, unimpeded surface water flow which causes sheet and
rill soil erosion, unregulated storm flows, reduction of
downstream flow due to diversion of water upstream, floods, mass
wasting, and polluted water of inadequate or dangerous quality.
Examples of positive externalities which derive from upstream
watershed treatments include regulated water flow which reduces
crop damage, sufficient supplies of irrigation water, improved
water quality, and decreased sediment loads.
Landholder exposure to externalities is predominantly a function
of their location in the watershed.  As illustrated in Figure 1.,
most of the upstream landholders (a, b and d) are not impacted by
the land use of others.  Midstream landholders (c, e, g and h)
are impacted by upstream actions, and the holder of the most
downstream position (i) is the most vulnerable of all.
Landholders e and g would be impacted by f's land use due to
surface flow of water and or soil.  Similarly, i could be
impacted by surface erosion from g and h as well as gully
erosion produced by all upstream holders.
In sum, when assessing the potential for watershed management,
two key elements should be considered:  1)  the vested interests
are asymmetrically interdependent ("i.e." upstream activity
affects downstream value); and  2) a degree of uncertainty
(behavioral and physical) exists as to the impact of this
interdependence ("i.e." downstream owners are uncertain of
upstream owner behavior and of the physical impacts of that
behavior).  Different actors are also exposed to different
uncertainty and risks dependent upon relative position in the
watershed and nature of the resources held.LANDHOLDER COOPERATION FOR WATERSHED MANAGEMENT: A REVIEW OF
RELEVANT LITERATURE
Incentives and Conditions for Collective Action
The author's thesis is that, in contrast to the conventional
"physical" perspective, watersheds should be considered as sets
of vested interests (and social relations) within a physically
defined space.  In essence, watersheds are physically defined
subsets of rural society.  Actors with vested interests within
watersheds are inter-dependent because of trans-boundary water
flow.  From this perspective, watershed management is a question
of social relations, and cooperation (or coordination) between
individual vested interests.  This gives rise to other questions:
What incentives are necessary for individual action?;  What
conditions are necessary for cooperation to occur?; and  What
role could governments and projects have in fostering
coordination or collective action between individuals with
interests in watersheds?
The literature on cooperation, incentives and mechanisms for
collective action is immense and diverse.  Only that which is
most relevant will be highlighted here.  Early scholars (Gordon
1954, Olson 1965, and Buchannan and Tullock 1962) examined
cooperation and collective action from a logical, atomistic
perspective as it applied to political decision and public goods.
They generally emphasized the individual's incentive to maximize
individual returns or to "free ride".  Land economists have
examined these issues for a number of years, but the majority of
literature concerning collective action and resource use followed
the publication of Garret Hardin's famous article, "The tragedy
of the commons" (1968).  Succeeding studies have since dispelled
his thesis that individual rational use of common resources
inevitably leads to socially irrational results ("i.e." resource
degradation) (McCay and Acheson 1987, Ostrom 1988, Runge 1984,
Uphoff 1986, Wade 1987.
These scholars and others learned that in the real world, when
faced with the degradation of a critical and jointly used
resource, communities often create institutional arrangements to
preserve the resource and sustain their livelihoods (Uphoff
1986).  The result of such institutional arrangements is what has
come to be termed a "common property resource" (Wade 1987).
Axelrod (1984) contributed to the debate by testing cooperative
behavior with a computerized Prisoners Dilemma game and found
that the Tit for Tat strategy (cooperation based on reciprocity),
rather than defection ("i.e." "free riding") dominated in long-
term play.  Scholars such as Elinor Ostrom (1985, 1986, 1988,
1989, 1990) have intensified research into resource topology,
incentives for collective action, and institutional arrangements
for resource management.
The trans-boundary water flow externality found in watersheds
creates conditions for collective action analogous to those found
in common property resource and irrigation system managementsituations.  The physical attributes of watersheds and common
property differ and thus the nature of the externalities differ.
In watersheds the externality is asymmetrical (unevenly impacting
landholders), and in common property situations the externality
is symmetric (evenly affecting all holders).  Irrigation systems
are more alike the watershed case in that the externalities are
asymmetrical.  Watershed externalities are both more complex and
greater in number because of the potential for surface flow and
other vegetational impacts.  Nonetheless, the literature
concerning institutional arrangements for common property and
irrigation management can be adapted to the watershed
coordination problem.
Economic Factors Inducing Landholder Cooperation
Many economic and socio-cultural variables might induce an
individual to participate in collective action for watershed
management.  In essence, the economic incentive for landholder
cooperation derives from the fact that if landholders coordinate
land use, then each can operate to optimize their land's
productivity.  Since their productivity is impacted by upstream
action, it is in their interest to influence upstream
landholder's behavior.  A failure to cooperate results in a
Pareto-inferior outcome ("i.e." an outcome that is the least
preferred by landholders of all potential outcomes).  The degree
to which each landholder is affected by other landholder's
behavior determines their incentive to cooperate.  There is thus
a potential for net individual and social gains with cooperation.
This potential for gain induces the establishment of
institutional arrangements which control land use.
In economic terms, the trans-boundary water flow is a good that
is jointly supplied to watershed residents and jointly consumed
by those residents.  It is this physical jointness which causes
interdependence.  The physical nature of the watershed results in
the fact that only the landholder in the most upstream position
is not dependent on the land use of other landholders.  The most
upstream landholder though is not beyond interdependence as
downstream holders are dependent on their action.  Midstream and
downstream residents are affected by the flow whether they like
it or not, and can influence the upstream owner to alter their
behavior.  There is also a degree of non-excludability of actors.
Downstream landholders can benefit from upstream treatments
whether they cooperate in the activity or not.  This is a case of
a "free rider" problem.  Watershed residents can operate as they
wish concerning land use, and can not be excluded from the
benefits of the water resource.
Figure 1. Schematic of a watershed with nine landholders.
From Figure 1., landholder i clearly has the greatest incentive
to induce watershed treatments because of his/her location, while
holders a, b, and d are more favorably situated.  If c and e (who
are the most exposed to gully erosion) decide to install
treatments to reduce erosion, then all those downstream (g, h,and i) will benefit.  If they do so without assisting c and e to
establish the treatments, then they are essentially "free
riding".  Depending upon slope and land use characteristics, f
(though downstream from b) may not have sufficient incentive to
cooperate on upstream treatments.  Similarly, as the water course
forms the property boundary between g and h, neither might have
sufficient incentive to cooperate on upstream treatments.
Resource economists who have studied questions of property rights
and externalities have concluded that resource use and
externalities are inextricably connected and ubiquitous, and that
institutions naturally evolve to regulate these externalities
(Dragun (1983), Schmid (1988), Russel (1982)).  Hayami and Ruttan
have taken this analysis a step further and identify changes in
factor prices or resource endowments as the fundamental
inducement for an institutional innovation (Hayami and Ruttan
1985).  For example, if rice prices suddenly doubled and if the
watershed were treated, it could produce rice, landholders would
suddenly have greater incentive to cooperate on the treatment.
Other incentives for landholder cooperation are that watershed
treatment increases the security of expectations concerning
watershed resources, and participation in group activities
provides a hedge against individual failure (Runge 1981).
In considering incentives for collective action Runge (1981 and
1986) stated that ultimately an individual's interest in
collective action is a question of assurance.  Are the
individuals assured that their action will be reciprocated by
others ("e.g." will their investment in the collective activity
be met by the others concerned)?  His research indicates that
"cooperative institutional rules are endogenous  adaptive
responses to the problem of uncertainty about the expected
actions of others" and that social rules generally govern
assurance meaning that strong social pressure would discourage
"free riding" (1981).  This of course would be dependent upon the
cultural and social arrangements in each specific watershed area.
Dixon and Easter (1986) found that "One of the key components for
developing institutions for watershed management is to devise
institutions which minimize transaction costs of collective
action".
In examining the institutional aspects of irrigation system
management, Bromley et al (1980) describe the difference between
nominal location and real location of landholdings along the
irrigation system.  Though a downstream landholder has an
unfavorable nominal location, if this holder has substantial
political power in the local community then they have a favorable
real location.  This critical insight has direct relevance to
watershed management.  Though location might impact the holders
incentive to act towards collective action, the key factor
affecting management is the ability and will to act.
In sum, degrees of supply jointness, excludability and risk
exposure are a function of slope, soils, land use, location in
the watershed and the water flow characteristics.  These
variables, along with relative factor prices, affect the economic
incentives for any and all actors to induce collective action.Summary: Factors Affecting the Emergence of Landholder
Cooperation
Some of the economic factors inducing landholder cooperation
have been described in the previous section.  These and other
socio-cultural factors which would positively affect the
emergence of formal or non-formal cooperative arrangements have
been summarized below.
Economic Factors:
1) the size of potential individual and social gain from
cooperation ("i.e." perceived individual and social gains exceed
individual and social costs);
2) costs and benefits from cooperation are fair and equitably
distributed; and
3) transaction costs associated with establishing and maintaining
cooperative action are low (these would be lower if collective
arrangements already existed among watershed landholders) (after
Gibbs 1986).
4) upstream and downstream landholders are not exposed to
substantially different levels and frequency of watershed
externalities (after Ostrom 1985).
Socio-cultural Factors:
1) the stability, homogeneity of landholders ("e.g." landholders
are not strongly divided by: conflictive use patterns,
perceptions of risk, social antagonisms);
2) the personal interests of rural elites is enhanced or at least
not compromised by watershed cooperation activities (after
Chambers "et al." 1989);
3) community ability to communicate and enforce rules of
cooperation is strong;
4) landholders have previous cooperative experience (after Runge
1986);
5) landholders are willing to adopt conservationist practices (a
function of land security, productive value of the soil, capacity
to invest time and labor in adoption, and natural attitude toward
risk and innovation;
6) scale of social penalties and sanctions is sufficiently high
to discourage "free riders" (Ostrom 1990); and
7) other cultural factors related to cooperation exist ("e.g."
cultural disposition to cooperation, solidarity, conviviality and
other forms of "social euphoria" (Fernandez 1987)).
8) the number of landholders in the watershed is relativelysmall, or the number or political weight of those who intend to
cooperate is sufficient to overcome resistance (i.e. a "critical
mass");
9) the size of the watershed is relatively small, or the cultural
and jurisdictional boundaries and watershed conditions are
sufficiently known and clear to inhabitants;
10) watershed location: watershed isolation or remoteness helps
in retaining mutual obligations (after Chambers et al. 1989); and
11) landholder residences are in close proximity to land or
interests held in the watershed.
Processes: How Collective Action Institutions Actually Emerge
By what process might a group of landholders initiate cooperation
for the treatment of their watershed?  How do collective action
institutions actually emerge?  Answers to these questions assist
us in understanding spontaneously generated cooperation for
watershed treatment, and in devising development strategies which
promote such behavior.
Ostrom (1985) proposed that for a collective action institution
to evolve, resource users must have a common understanding of the
problem and of the alternatives for coordination, and have a
common perception of mutual trust and reciprocity, and
decisionmaking costs should not exceed the benefits of
cooperation.  Ostrom (1985) also made the following general
propositions concerning the emergence of collective action groups
with respect to a common property resource (CPR):
"Individuals will tend to switch from independent strategies for
exploiting a CPR to more costly, coordinated strategies when they
share a common understanding that:
- Continuance of their independent strategies will seriously harm
an important resource for their survival;
- Coordinated strategies exist that effectively reduce the risk
of serious harm to the CPR;
- Most of the other users of the CPR can be counted to change
strategies if they promise to do so; and
- The cost of decision making about future coordinated strategies
is less than the benefits to be derived from the adoption of
coordinated strategies."
After studying social movements and collective action on public
goods, anthropologist Gerlach (1990) developed the following
six-step process by which trans-boundary interdependencies become
institutionalized:
1) definition of the resource of concern (biophysical
relationships);
2) definition of resource users (socio-cultural relationships);3) definition of the interdependencies of the users (resource
jointness and externalities);
4) building claims of rights, duties, privileges and obligations
of resource use;
5) building assurances between users with sanctions and
enforcement mechanisms; and
6) building structures for coordination of resource use.
Another informative set of literature relevant to the process of
watershed landholder cooperation is that on resource regimes.
This literature provides a framework for understanding how
individuals (groups or nations) can cooperate on problems which
cross their common boundaries in ways other than through the free
market or centralized command (Gerlach 1989).  Regimes
essentially evolve when a critical mass of impacted individuals
develop consensual knowledge concerning the trans-boundary
problem and potential solutions to that problem, and is an
reflection of common purpose (Lipschutz 1989).  Young (1985)
identifies three types of regimes: spontaneous, negotiated, and
imposed.  Language is an example of a spontaneous regime, the
United Nations system an example of a negotiated regime, and
colonial hegemony an example of an imposed regime.
The pre-existence of local institutions which are directly
impacted by the trans-boundary problem facilitate the formation
of regimes.  For example: it might be more efficient (and
effective) for Ducks Unlimited Minnesota and Ducks Unlimited
Manitoba to establish and enforce hunting rights to migratory
fowl, than for the central governments of Canada and the United
States to formally negotiate regulations and policing mechanisms.
Similarly, the United Nations might be more effective in
resolving trans-boundary disputes had it been formed as an
international extension of pre-existing, national social justice
groups rather than as a totally new institution.  Such regimes
composed of pre-existing institutions would be efficient because
of mutual consensus concerning purpose, and low transaction costs
associated with local organizations.  Such regimes have evolved
spontaneously and indicate that such a process could occur for
watershed management.CONCLUSIONS: PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINABLE UPLAND WATERSHED
MANAGEMENT
The Potential for Landholder Cooperation
There is a great and widespread need for the management of upland
watersheds in many developing countries, both for the protection
of on-site and off-site interests.  Because of the widespread
ineffectiveness of legislative approaches to watershed
management, most developing countries have taken a "project"
approach to influencing land use in specific, fragile upland
areas.  These projects have, by most reports, usually failed to
achieve sustained watershed protection.  Watershed management
project evaluations have generally identified an inadequate
concern for institutional issues as a major cause of project
weakness.  These institutional issues occur at three levels:
1) national ("e.g." inappropriate national economic policies,
funding commitments, or a lack of government agency
coordination);  2) project ("e.g." lack of integrating local
institutions, concerns or linkages into project planning and
management); and 3) local ("e.g." failure to recognize and
effectively promote cooperation between watershed landholders)
(after Brooks "et al." 1990a).
The inadequate concern for institutional issues is due, to a
large extent, to the conventional preoccupation with the physical
relationships within watersheds.  The author's thesis is that, in
contrast to the conventional "physical" perspective, watersheds
should be considered as sets of vested interests (and social
relations) within a physically defined space.  In essence,
watersheds are physically defined subsets of rural society.
Actors with vested interests within watersheds are inter-
dependent because of water flow across political boundaries.
>From this perspective, the achievement of watershed management is
a question of social relations, and cooperation (or coordination)
between individual vested interests.  These vested interests are
separated by political boundaries or institutional arrangements
which rarely correspond to the topographic limits of watersheds.
When assessing the potential for watershed management, two key
elements should be considered:  1)  the vested interests are
asymmetrically interdependent ("i.e." upstream activity affects
downstream value); and  2) a degree of uncertainty (behavioral
and physical) exists as to the impact of this interdependence
("i.e." downstream owners are uncertain of upstream owner
behavior and of the physical impacts of that behavior).
Different actors are also exposed to different uncertainty and
risks dependent upon relative position in the watershed, social
affiliation, and nature of the resources held.
These dilemmas must be understood and overcome by local peoples
in order to achieve sustained management.  In this light,
sustained watershed management is a "conceptual" rather than a
"physical" innovation, and can only be achieved if the conceptual
innovation of coordinated land use for individual and social gain
(i.e. watershed management) is adopted by permanent local
institutions.  Sustained watershed management then is thecollective adoption of the concept of coordinated land use.
It is not necessarily signaled by the expedient adoption of
specific, physical treatments.
Approaches used to promote watershed management should meet at
least the following criteria:  1) the approach must result in
sustained and diffused upland management;  2) the approach must
be affordable enough to impact large areas (or at least require
limited donor capital); and 3) the approach must be politically
and socio-culturally appropriate.  Voluntary upland landholder
cooperation, either promoted at the national or project level,
can meet the above criteria as:
1) mid- and downstream holders have natural economic incentives
to act for coordinated management, and these holders can exert
social pressure on upstream actors to conform;
2) the creation of new institutional arrangements to preserve and
sustain individual livelihoods is a natural social response to
externalities, and these extensions of pre-existing social
arrangements are sustainable;
3) the formation of these natural social responses, in the form
of new institutions and social arrangements can be stimulated and
facilitated by external forces;
4) pre-existing trust, consensual knowledge, reciprocated action,
and social sanctioning mechanisms facilitates the collective
adoption of the watershed management innovation;
5) once the conceptual innovation of coordinated land management
is adopted by permanent institutions in one locality it can
spontaneously diffuse to other watersheds via established social
linkages;
6) landholders can tailor cooperative arrangements to local
socio-cultural patterns; and
7) diffusion of the watershed management conceptual innovation
may be slow and irregular, but it could be less expensive than
conventional investments in targeted mechanical treatments.
A Framework for Action
Development agents should begin with the premises that:  for
upland watershed management to be sustainable it must be an
extension and an incremental transformation of existing social
relationships;  this extension of relationships can be stimulated
(but not forced) by external agents;  the character of the
cooperative arrangement must be authored by local inhabitants in
order to mesh with existing social standards and priorities; and,
this extension can be achieved by dialogue with individual
landholders and local institutions.
As government policy and political will impact decisions made by
local individuals and institutions, governmental support, even if
rhetorical, could indirectly facilitate the formation oflandholder cooperation units.  By providing a climate conducive
to cooperation, and the appropriate information concerning
interdependencies and optional forms of cooperation, watershed
"regimes" could spontaneously form.  Specific state level action
might include: high political exposure to the problem and
options; educational radio campaigns; general support for popular
organizations and inter-organizational exchanges; tax relief or
additional development assistance to a watershed adopting
cooperative treatment, or training sessions by government
extension services.
Projects targeting specific watersheds could use intensive
approaches which either encourage the formation of new
cooperative institutions, strengthen existing ones, or facilitate
inter-institutional coordination.  The role of the project would
be to initiate inhabitant discussion of watershed problems and
possible actions.  More specifically, agents should stimulate
landholder cooperation along the lines of the natural processes
examined by E. Ostrom and L. Gerlach.  The project should not
develop rigid and complicated plans which compromise local
participation and authorship of the cooperative arrangement.
A rough synopsis of the proposed process follows:
1) The first step should be project diagnosis of the economic
incentives for cooperation, overall costs, and overall benefits
with local representatives.  Before proceeding, the project
should assure that the potential benefits of cooperation exceed
the expected decision-making and other inhabitant input costs.
2) Agents should then identify watershed landholders, and
institutions to which they belong ("e.g." labor exchange, kin,
marketing, religious), and linkages within and beyond the
targeted watersheds.
3) The next steps would be to enable landholders to reach
consensus concerning the costs and distribution of watershed
problems.  This consensus should correspond to the recognition of
landholder interdependency and a common understanding of the
various alternatives to achieve coordinated land use.  Towards
this end the project could sponsor meetings where watershed
inhabitants debate these issues.
4) If inhabitants reach consensus concerning the problem and
agree to act cooperatively, then the next step would be the
establishment of the collective action institution.  This
institution could be formal or non-formal, and would include the
building of  rights, duties, and sanctions to discourage "free
riding".  These institutional rules could be either implicit or
explicit dependent upon the socio-cultural setting.NOTES
1. In this text the term "institutions" refers to both
institutional arrangements ("i.e." defined rights and
responsibilities among individuals and groups), and
organizational arrangements ("i.e." purposive, ordered groups of
individuals) (Gibbs 1986).
2. The phrase "landholder cooperation for watershed management"
refers to cooperation on watershed management activities between
individuals who own or operate on contiguous lands within the
same watershed.  The term "cooperation" is used in this text to
mean "an organizational relationship in which joint action is
undertaken to achieve individual operating goals" (West "et.al."
1990:105).
3. The term externality applies to situations in which the
actions of one individual or firm create costs or benefits for
another entity, but the individual or firm does not consider
these costs or benefits when making decisions about their own
action (Russel 1982).
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